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GENERAL WELFARE AND REGIONAL
PLANNING: HOW THE LAW OF
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND THE
MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE GAVE NEW
JERSEY A MODERN STATE PLAN
JOHN M. PAYNE*
INTRODUCTION
The topic of this symposium is state and regional land use
planning, not exclusionary zoning or affordable housing. The
Mount Laurel doctrine,1 which requires New Jersey municipali-
ties to provide opportunities for their "fair share" of the regional
need for low and moderate income housing,2 is this country's
most widely known judicial exegesis on exclusionary zoning and
affordable housing. Nonetheless, the two Mount Laurel cases
and the process they have spawned, also constitute a major
achievement in the modern history of land use planning.
On one level, the argument is obvious to the point of sim-
plicity. Making provisions for the present and future housing
needs of all segments of a. state's population should be a key con-
cern of any legitimate planning process. However, the well-
documented problems that have arisen in connection with the
implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine have undercut any
praise based solely on the cases' contributions to housing plan-
ning. Non-compliance has always been widespread (particularly
early on), and the complex formula and rules that have evolved to
*Professor of Law and Justice Frederick Hall Scholar, Rutgers Law School-
Newark.
1 See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I], rev'd, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983)
[hereinafter Mount Laurel IM]. Although Mount Laurel I was reversed by Mount
Laurel II in 1983, the Mount Laurel doctrine is derived from sections of both cases.
2 See Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 724 (concluding that municipalities must
implement land use regulations that offer an "appropriate variety and choice of
housing" and different types of living accommodations).
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administer the "fair share" methodology are, in some respects,
the antithesis of sound planning.3 Although there are many in-
teresting topics that could be discussed here, they are more prop-
erly left for an affordable housing symposium.
Instead, the two Mount Laurel cases can be used as the
starting point for an exploration of the landscape of state and re-
gional planning. As will be shown, the evolution of the Mount
Laurel doctrine is the main reason New Jersey is currently able
to enjoy the fruits of an adequate State Development and Rede-
velopment Plan ("SDRP"). Furthermore, the logic of the Mount
Laurel decisions exemplify how state and regional plans, which
notoriously suffer from under-enforcement in all but a handful of
states, can be made more effective, not only in New Jersey but all
around the country.
I. BACKGROUND: THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE AND THE
CONCEPT OF REGIONAL PLANNING
In 1975, the first Mount Laurel case4 established the neces-
sity for regional planning in New Jersey by placing the constitu-
tional fair share housing obligation in the context of regional
housing need:
We conclude that every [developing] municipality must, by its
land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible
an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically,
presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity... for low
and moderate income housing and in its regulations must af-
firmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of the
municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional
need therefor.
... So, when [land use] regulation does have a substantial ex-
ternal impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the bor-
3 See John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1685, 1709 (1998) (reviewing CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE
AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996)); John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary
Zoning and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L.
REV. 665, 667-73 (1996) (exploring the problem of non-compliance associated with
the Mount Laurel doctrine); John M. Payne, Remedies for Affordable Housing: From
Fair Share to Growth Share, 49 LAND USE & ZONING L. DIG., June 1997, at 3, 4-5
(discussing problems associated with planning issues).
4 Mount Laurel I, supra note 1.
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ders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and
must be recognized and served.5
In crafting the Mount Laurel I opinion, Justice Frederick
Hall understood that in order to achieve regional fairness in pro-
viding low-income housing opportunities, a planning process
would be required:
It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive obliga-
tion arises for each such municipality affirmatively to plan and
provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity
for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of
course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, de-
sires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to
live within its boundaries.
We have previously held that a developing municipality may
properly zone for and seek industrial ratables to create a better
economic balance for the community vis-a-vis educational and
governmental costs engendered by residential development,
provided that such was "* * * done reasonably as part of and in
furtherance of a legitimate comprehensive plan for the zoning of
the entire municipality."6
Hemmed in by land use statutes, there was only so much
that the court could do about local zoning. Justice Hall nonethe-
less dropped broad hints about the necessity for regional plan-
ning:
Frequently it might be sounder to have more of such housing,
like some specialized land uses, in one municipality in a region
than in another, because of greater availability of suitable land,
location of employment, accessibility of public transportation or
some other significant reason. But under present New Jersey
legislation, zoning must be on an individual municipal basis,
rather than regionally.
This Court long ago pointed out " * * * the unreality in dealing
with zoning problems on the basis of the territorial limits of a
municipality." It is now clear that the Legislature accepts the
fact that at least land use planning, to be of any value, must be
5 Id. at 724-26.
6 Id. at 728-31 (quoting Gruber v. Mayor & Township Comm. of Raritan Town-
ship, 186 A.2d 489, 493 (N.J. 1962)).
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done on a much broader basis than each municipality sepa-
rately.... Authorization for regional zoning-the implementa-
tion of planning-,... would seem to be logical and desirable as
the next legislative step. 7
As the litigation that became Mount Laurel I wound its way
slowly through the courts, and especially as it became clear that
the Supreme Court would intervene to stop exclusionary zoning,
several enlightened proposals to create a state-level planning
process were considered. All such legislation languished, how-
ever, in the face of implacable opposition from a Legislature
dominated by suburban interests.8 The Governor tried to cir-
cumvent legislative inertia by Executive Order,9 tying discretion-
ary state infrastructure grants to Mount Laurel compliance.
Moreover, the Governor established a housing study within the
executive branch that eventually resulted in what became known
as the Housing Allocation Report ("HAR'), an early form of the
fair share formula that eventually emerged from Mount Laurel
ILI Indicative of the political sensitivity of the issue, however,
the HAR was circulated in 1978 not only as a "draft," but with
the additional caution that it was " 'tentative and subject to fur-
7 Id. at 732 & n.22 (quoting Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Creek-
skill, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 1949)).
8 On the day that Mount Laurel I was announced, March 24, 1975, State Sena-
tor Martin Greenberg, a close ally of then-Governor Brendan Byrne, symbolically
introduced the Comprehensive Balanced Housing Plan Act; it died in committee. See
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219 n.42 (N.J.
1977). The bill as proposed would have given the Department of Community Affairs
("DCA") the authority to determine what the local affordable housing needs of the
population were and would have authorized the DCA to set zoning requirements for
each township accordingly. Id. All the township was required to do under the bill
was to leave the housing market unrestricted. Id. See generally MICHAEL N.
DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 294-300 (1976) (discussing the opposition
the bill faced from the legislature); DAVID L. KMIP ET. AL., OUR TOWN: RACE,
HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 114-19 (1995) (discussing various legislative
attempts to open up the suburbs in New Jersey).
9 See Exec. Order No. 35 (N.J. 1976) (ordering the Division of State and Re-
gional Planning to "prepare State housing goals to guide municipalities in adjusting
their municipal land-use regulations in order to provide a reasonable opportunity for
the development of an appropriate variety and choice of housing to meet the needs of
the residents of New Jersey"); see also Exec. Order No. 46 (N.J. 1976) (ordering the
Division of State and Regional Planning to review and modify the "preliminary
housing allocation goals... to assure that they take into account current programs
designed to revitalize the cities of New Jersey").
10 See Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 422, 433, 437 (discussing the HAR and
study).
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ther public hearings and review.' "I' In an important 1977 deci-
sion, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,12 the
Supreme Court hinted that it would use the HAR as a prima fa-
cie fair share guide.13 Before another case came before the Court,
however, the newly elected Governor (a Republican who followed
a Democrat) rescinded the Executive Orders on which the HAR
was based.14 Seven months later, in Mount Laurel II, the Su-
preme Court had little choice but to back off.15
While public and political attention was concentrated on
Senator Greenberg's proposed State Planning Act and the still-
born HAR, a little noticed, statutorily authorized planning effort
was proceeding within the Department of Community Affairs,
the State Development Guide Plan ("SDGP"). Promulgated with-
out fanfare in May 1980,16 the SDGP had been adopted adminis-
tratively to qualify for certain United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development grant programs, without politi-
cal vetting and with only limited uses in mind.17 Indeed, but for
the New Jersey Supreme Court, the SDGP was undoubtedly des-
tined for the apocryphal fate of most mid-century "master
11 Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 437 (citation omitted) (explaining that the
New Jersey Division of State and Regional Planning promulgated the HAR as "[olne
possible resolution of the fair share issue"); see also Oakwood at Madison, 371 A.2d
at 1215 n.35, 1217 n.37, 1219 n.42 (explaining how the Division of State and Re-
gional Planning was to allocate regional needs).
12 371 A.2d 1192 (N.J. 1977).
13 See id. at 1220 (concluding that the term "region" had been adequately de-
fined by HAR and that the "fair share" plan had received "prima facie judicial accep-
tance").
14 See Exec. Order No. 6 (N.J. 1982) (voiding, inter alia, Executive Orders 35
and 46, and any regulations stemming from those orders); see also Mount Laurel H,
supra note 1, at 437 (explaining that although Executive Order No. 6 did not explic-
itly prohibit the use of HAR, use of it "would not be in keeping with the spirit of the
Governor's Executive Order").
15 The court in Mount Laurel II expressed its frustration with the confusion sur-
rounding the Mount Laurel I and Oakwood at Madison decisions. See Mount Laurel
II, supra note 1, at 438. The court admitted having "underestimated the pressures
that weigh against lower income housing" and it vowed to "begin a process aimed at
ultimately eliminating the uncertainty that surrounds these issues." Id.
16 The New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that the State Development Guide
Plan promulgated in May 1980 was a "satisfactory alternative" to Mount Laurel L
Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 423. The court implied that among the problems
associated with the original plan set forth in Mount Laurel I was a lack of official
guidance over future state planning. See id.
17 See H. Gottlieb, For State Planners It's Policy (and Politics), 122 N.J. L.J. 601,
620 (1988) (offering a useful summary of New Jersey planning history).
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plans'--"gathering dust on a shelf."8 As one disgruntled SDGP
opponent later said, invoking the hyperbole that seems to infect
most state plan debates, "it was a dictatorial document written in
the back room by five people."19 All of that was changed by
Mount Laurel II.
II. JUDICIALLY MANDATED STATE PLANNING
In Mount Laurel II, Chief Justice Wilentz described the
SDGP as a "satisfactory alternative" to the loose compliance pro-
cesses established by Mount Laurel I (and, implicitly, as a satis-
factory alternative, as well, to the court undertaking its own
planning process). 20 He then inflated the SDGP to an authorita-
tive expression of state policy with respect to where growth (and
hence Mount Laurel fair share obligations) should occur.21 No
one was fooled by Chief Justice Wilentz's assertion that the
SDGP was a legitimate expression of state policy because it "re-
flects a great deal of thought, preparation, and participation by a
wide variety of interested parties."22 Conspicuously absent from
the Chiefs itemization of "interested parties" was the New Jersey
Legislature. What he really meant was that, a plan obviously
being needed, the SDGP could serve as a legitimate document for
judicial use because it was based on "proven sound planning con-
cepts" and was "substantially similar, in concept and approach,
to various regional planning documents by other [unofficial] enti-
ties, such as the TriState Regional Planning Association."23
The SDGP is history, and its failings as a planning document
need not be restated here. Crafted in obscurity and never hard-
ened in the crucible of political debate, it was at best a temporary
solution that could not have borne for long the weight thrust
upon it by the court. But it did not have to, and in its brief tra-
jectory across my story, it is one of the brightest stars. This is so
for two reasons.
First, as just indicated, in defending the use of the SDGP,
the Mount Laurel I Court solidly reinforced the message of Jus-
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 426.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 424 n.9.
2 Id. at 424.
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tice Hall's Mount Laurel I opinion-the importance of "sound"
and "regional" planning as a corollary to the constitutional prohi-
bition of exclusionary zoning. The linkage is made by Chief Jus-
tice Wilentz's famous observation in Mount Laurel II, in dis-
cussing the constitutional basis of the Mount Laurel doctrine,
that "the state controls the use of land, all of the land."24 It is be-
cause the state (justly) interferes in the ability of private indi-
viduals to make land use decisions solely on their own that land
use controls must be made subject to fairness review. Both
Mount Laurel decisions-Mount Laurel 11 explicitly in its use of
the SDGP-link constitutional fairness to sound regional plan-
ning.25 After Mount Laurel II, one can comfortably assert that
regional planning is, if not constitutionally mandated, at least of
constitutional significance unless municipalities are willing to
give up land use powers altogether.
The other reason that the SDGP is so important to New Jer-
sey's planning history is that in Mount Laurel 11 the court put
the power of the courts behind enforcement of "sound, regional
planning."26 Suddenly, a document that its drafters thought
would be of bureaucratic use mostly to smooth the way for fed-
eral grants, was being pored over by planners, lawyers, mayors
24 Id. at 415.
2 See id. (explaining that the state's constitutional obligation is to fairly allo-
cate use of its lands). A state government cannot favor the rich over the poor, it must
be representative of all of its citizens. See id.; see also Mount Laurel I, supra note 1,
at 725.
It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter at what
level of government, must conform to the basic state constitutional re-
quirements of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws.
These are inherent in Art. I, par. 1 of our Constitution, the requirements of
which may be more demanding than those of the federal Constitution.
Mount Laurel I, supra note 1, at 725 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 277,
281-83 (N.J. 1973) and Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Board of Regents, 64 A.2d 443,
447-48 (N.J. 1949)).
2 Mount Laurel H, supra note 1, at 424. The court in Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 (N.J. 1977), explained the role of the Divi-
sion of State and Regional Planning in executing their proposed comprehensive
housing allocation plan. See id. at 1217 n.37. Some of the factors that the court took
into consideration were "(1) the extent of the housing need in the region; (2) the ex-
tent of employment growth or decline; (3) fiscal capacity to absorb the housing goal;
and (4) availability of appropriate sites for the housing goal." Id. The court felt that
by predetermining the "region," the Division of State and Regional Planning would
be able to allocate housing need "with relative fairness to all of the ... municipali-
ties." Id.
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and developers, and was being given effect at the level of individ-
ual plots of land in Mount Laurel litigation.27
The combination of these two elements-judicial reliance on
and enforcement of a "voluntary" state or regional plan as the
means to give content to a vaguely worded constitutional obliga-
tion to protect "the general welfare," provides the model for
achieving the goal of meaningful state and regional planning. In
New Jersey and many other states, there is little or no political
will to do so otherwise. Consider what happened next.
III. THE STATE PLANNING ACT OF 1995
The SDGP was adopted in May 1980. Mount Laurel 11 made
it the centerpiece of fair share planning in January 1983. In July
1984, Judge Eugene Serpentelli, one of the three specially desig-
nated Mount Laurel trial judges, published the first authoritative
judicial opinion on Mount Laurel II compliance. 28 The decision
imposed the first specific fair share obligation on individual mu-
nicipalities at that time.29 It is no coincidence that during the
winter of 1984 to 1985, the New Jersey Legislature finally began
to undertake serious, positive negotiations looking towards a
statutory implementation of the constitutional obligation de-
clared in the Mount Laurel cases.30
The best known result, the New Jersey Fair Housing Act, be-
came effective on July 2, 1985.31 It established the Council on Af-
fordable Housing ("COAH"), an administrative agency which, in
combination with statutory incentives designed to minimize Su-
perior Court litigation, was to oversee most Mount Laurel com-
27 See Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 499 A.2d
565, 567 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (determining that a developer's entitlement
to a builder's remedy, the most valuable outcome for a private litigant in a Mount
Laurel case, turned on which "growth" classification the land was assigned by the
SDGP).
28 See AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 504 A.2d 692 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1984).
29 See id. at 694 (holding that the question in Mount Laurel-type cases should be
whether or not the municipality has a reasonable methodology for determining what
is "fair share" of low and moderate income housing).
30 See Gottlieb, supra note 17, at 12.
31 The New Jersey Fair Housing Act essentially codifies the Mount Laurel doc-
trine by outlining the key factors that are imperative to make a comprehensive state
planning system effective. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 (West 1986).
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pliance.3 2 Less well known is the fact that simultaneously the
Legislature finally passed the State Planning Act,3 3 which, in
protean form, had been on the table since 1976. Unlike the nar-
row housing focus of the Fair Housing Act, the State Planning
Act looked towards the creation of a comprehensive SDRP3 4 to
replace the much-maligned SDGP. This plan mandated an active
"cross-acceptance" process which insured political visibility and
large scale participation of, if not the public at large, then at
least those "interested parties" which Chief Justice Wilentz had
spoken rhetorically about in 1983. 35
The State Planning Act thrust New Jersey into the small
group of states that were giving serious attention to the process
of state and regional planning. There was no groundswell of
popular support for state planning; indeed, in a state where
"home rule" is a potent political platform, the SDRP continued to
be viewed with a good deal of suspicion, if not outright hostility.
New Jersey now has an adequate state plan and (perhaps equally
important) a sufficiently staffed State Planning Commission.
These changes can be attributed to the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the importance of good planning. Although the Court
grasped for the best plan it could find-the old SDGP-that plan
wasn't very good at all. New Jersey now has a better plan, the
SDRP. Faced with a choice, and with the recognition that some
plan was going to be implemented, it was obviously in most peo-
ple's interest to implement the best one that the political system
could deliver.
An "unintended consequence" of the two Mount Laurel opin-
ions-a consequence that in the long run may be more enduring
than the specific affordable housing rules of those two cases-is
that New Jersey now has a workable state plan. But state courts
32 See generally Paula Franzese, Mount Laurel Iff: The New Jersey Supreme
Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 30 (1988) (containing a useful
summary of the Act and the litigation establishing its constitutionality).
33 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-196 (West 1985) (codifying the requirement for
sound and integrated state-wide planning).
34 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-200 (West 1985) (listing the development and
conservation objectives to meet the needs of the State of New Jersey).
35 See Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, at 424 n.9 (discussing the distribution of
the preliminary draft of the guide plan to "all State agencies, regional and county
planning agencies, all municipalities and public libraries"). The 1992 version of the
plan is available on the New Jersey website at <http'//www.state.nj.us/osp/
ospplan2.htm>.
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are not lining up to emulate the Mount Laurel cases in their own
constitutional rulings, and so the specific history in New Jersey
cannot serve as a model for other states in need of better plan-
ning. The New Jersey experience can be reinterpreted, however,
to give it more general interest, as discussed below.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDRP
While the SDRP is undeniably a better state plan than its
predecessor, the SDGP, it is far from perfect. Its chief failing is
that it lacks a meaningful implementation mechanism for its
finely wrought policies. This is no surprise. At the time the
SDRP was being formulated, the kind of political consensus that
would have resulted in a plan with enforcement "teeth" simply
was lacking in New Jersey. The contrast with states whose plans
had sufficient enforcement mechanisms is instructive. The
strength of Oregon's plan, for example, can be traced to the leg-
islature's recognition of the fact that Oregon's pristine environ-
ment would likely attract the attention of many people wishing to
migrate from the eastern part of the United States and Northern
California. They recognized that without carefully managed
growth boundaries, their beauty and the source of their prosper-
ity would soon turn to sprawl.3 6 Lacking the consensus that Ore-
gon (and to some extent Florida and Vermont as well) had devel-
oped, the New Jersey State Planning Act pulls its punches and
simply contains no language at all dealing with enforcement of
the SDRP. Revealing the underlying politics of state planning,
however, the SDRP itself declares explicitly that "[the State
Plan is not a regulation but a policy guide for the State, regional
and local agencies to use when they exercise their delegated
authority."37
New Jersey is probably typical of the ambivalence that most
states display towards state and regional planning. In this re-
spect, the current SDRP is procedurally not much of an im-
provement on its SDGP predecessor. Growth versus no-growth
36 See generally PLANNING THE OREGON WAY 71-75 (Carl Abbott et al. eds.,
1994) (discussing the historical basis for Oregon's plan and its enforcement mecha-
nisms).
37 NEW JERsEY STATE PLANNING COMMISSION, NEW JERSEY STATE
DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT PLAN 6 (1992) [hereinafter SDRPI (discussing
the proper application of the state plan).
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decisions-the essence of modern state planning-are inherently
contentious. Landowners and developers stand to gain or lose
large profits, municipalities worry about tax ratables, and envi-
ronmentalists spring to the defense of obscure flora and fauna.
Any competent plan must be prepared to at least address these
kinds of issues. Moreover, a plan proponent who enters the fray
with an a priori understanding that state plan compliance is vol-
untary (meaning that it can be ignored at will) might as well stay
home and write angry letters to the editor instead.
Against this background, some of New Jersey's post-SDRP
experience has been predictable. New Jersey's Governor Whit-
man, an astute reader of the public mood, has drawn national at-
tention and favorable notice locally by inveighing against
"sprawl" in her second inaugural address. 38 She has repeatedly
called attention to the "smart growth" premise of the SDRP.39
But when it came time for her to fashion a plan of action, she
opted for and successfully passed a dramatic, billion-dollar ten-
year bond proposal. The proposal, backed by a dedicated portion
of sales tax revenue, was put forth to enable the state to pur-
chase environmentally sensitive land.40 No hint of giving the
SDRP regulatory force ever infiltrated this campaign.
There have been, however, two related lines of activity that
give some encouragement to planning advocates. First, back-
door plan enforcement has begun to evolve through incorporation
of plan criteria into administrative agency rules that do have the
force of law. Second, plan criteria are beginning to be noticed
and applied by courts, bringing the process full circle to where it
began with Mount Laurel I and II. Neither of these lines of de-
velopment could be called robust at this point. They do suggest,
however, a blueprint for how state and regional planning advo-
cates could devise a campaign for the long haul.
38 Governor Whitman stated, "[s]o often, what was natural land two or three
years ago is now a shopping center or a housing development .... Every part of New
Jersey suffers when we plan haphazardly. Sprawl eats up our open space. It creates
traffic jams that boggle the mind and pollute the air." Christine Todd Whitman, Sec-
ond Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1998) <http:J/www.state.nj.us/maug/ inaug.txt>.
39 See id. (describing a transformation in New Jersey through adding new
homes, redeveloping property, and establishing funds for neighborhood projects).
40 See Jennifer Preston, Referendums on Horse Racing and Open Spaces Ap-
proved-the Ballot Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at B14 (discussing the ballot
initiatives approved by New Jersey voters).
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V. INDIRECT ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATE PLAN:
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTION
Administrative agencies are bound to follow their own regu-
lations.41 Administrative agencies-most notably the Depart-
ment of Transportation ("DOT") and the Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection ("DEP")--control most of the infrastructure
construction (highways) and permitting (sewers and water) upon
which land development occurs. If these departments conform
their infrastructure decision-making to the criteria of the SDRP,
the state plan would, for all practical purposes, have the force of
law.
The Governor could simply order the executive agencies un-
der her control to implement the state plan by rule making, an
action that would seem straightforward in light of her apparent
embrace of the SDRP. Not only has that not happened, but the
reaction to the one timid step that the DEP has taken indicates
the difficulties to be encountered when a formal state plan con-
fronts the mix of law, finance, and politics that governs most
agency action. The DEP Commissioner issued an internal order
requiring DEP officials to "consider" the SDRP before making
regulatory decisions. The New Jersey State Builders Association
(which has never seen an acre of the Garden State that it did not
consider suitable for development), promptly challenged the or-
der as facially invalid on administrative law grounds. The Build-
ers Association argued that formal rule making was required.
Moreover, the Builders Association also pointed to the "not
regulatory" language from the plan itself. In its baldest terms,
the builders' nonsensical argument was that governmental agen-
cies should not be able to consider the state plan, despite the
years of work and millions of dollars it had consumed. In effect,
the Builders Association argued that as a matter of law, a master
plan could only gather dust on a shelf. The lower courts dis-
missed the builders' lawsuit, and the Supreme Court declined re-
41 See County of Hudson v. Department of Corrections, 703 A.2d 268, 274 (N.J.
1997) (citing In re Waterfront Dev. Permit, 582 A.2d 1018, 1022) (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (" 'For once an agency exercises its discretion and creates the proce-
dural rules under which it desires to have its actions judged, it denies itself the right
to violate the rules.'" (quoting Pacific Molasses Co. v. FTC, 356 F.2d 386, 389-90
(5th Cir. 1966))); see also In re Cafra, 704 A.2d 1261, 1271 (N.J. 1997) (indicating
that administrative agencies must follow their own regulations once promulgated).
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view, but only on the basis that until some actual decision was
made by an official aier "considering" the SDRP, the issue was
not ripe for review.42 This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the
value of "sound regional planning."
There is only one explicit, rule-backed agency embrace of the
SDRP and that has come from none other than the COAH, which
oversees the Mount Laurel process. By formal rule adoption,
COAH requires that low and moderate-income housing plans be
consistent with the SDRP in order for the municipality to receive
an all-important "Substantive Certification." Substantive Certi-
fication is important, because it is the formal agency action that
pronounces the municipality in compliance with the Mount Lau-
rel doctrine.4 Although the SDRP does not have the force of law,
the rules of administrative agencies are enforceable. By incorpo-
rating relevant portions of the SDRP into its own rule structure,
literally the only place in state government where the SDRP can
be enforced, as opposed to talked about, is before COAH. This
fact undoubtedly explains why the Builders Association was so
anxious to prevent even a modest initial foray by the DEP into
incorporating the SDRP policy structure.
The reason why COAH alone of all state agencies has taken
so aggressive a view of the state plan is simple. Because of
Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II, and the legislative enact-
ments that followed, COAH has to have a plan upon which it can
base its allocation of fair share obligations. It would have been
awkward, to say the least, for COAH to have turned its back on
the very plan, the SDRP, that owes its existence to the Mount
Laurel process.44
There is reason to emphasize COAH's formal, rule-based
adoption of the SDRP beyond the power that it gives the agency
to require plan compliance. It is not unknown for administrative
agencies, beset by the kinds of competing forces described above,
42 See New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 703
A.2d 323, 328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (noting that the builders had "not
demonstrate[d] that the administrative order under review ha[d] adversely affected
members of the Builders Association").
43 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 5:93-5.4 (1999) (requiring that new construc-
tion be in conformance with the State Development and Redevelopment Plan).
44 See Van Dalen v. Washington Township, 576 A.2d 819, 824 (N.J. 1990) (ac-
knowledging the SDRP as the successor to the SDGP that was mandated to be used
by Mount Laurel II).
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to cut corners in the enforcement of their own rules. Advocates of
all stripes, from environmentalists to road builders, have learned
how to sue agencies to force them into compliance with their own
rules. To take our example, COAH having conferred legally en-
forceable status on the SDRP by rule making now has to share
that enforcement power with private litigants who can ask the
courts to apply the rules (and the SDRP) to their benefit. The
genie is out of the bottle and cannot be recaptured. This is ex-
actly what has happened.
In as of yet unreported litigation involving Hillsborough
Township, New Jersey,45 COAH "substantively certified" a com-
pliance plan that involved the development of a 3000-unit, age-
restricted inclusionary development on a 742-acre site which was
located primarily in SDRP Planning Area 4 (rural) and Planning
Area 5 (environmentally sensitive).46 The proposal could not pos-
sibly meet the SDRP criteria for the limited, carefully controlled
amount of development that is permitted in these planning ar-
eas. Initially, however, COAH (with the unfortunate cooperation
of the State Planning Commission staff) approached Hillsbor-
ough's "plan" in the business-as-usual mode that is all too famil-
iar to land use lawyers. Relying on a series of "waivers" and
questionable interpretations of state plan policies, it managed to
conclude that the Hillsborough proposal was not inconsistent
with the SDRP. At this point, New Jersey Future, a private
watchdog group sued, and the pressure that the lawsuit gener-
ated eventually forced the township to effectively abandon its
own plan. At this point COAH, which had been opposing New
Jersey Future's arguments vigorously, had no choice but to re-
scind the grant of substantive certification. But in a major vic-
tory for proponents of the SDRP, COAH went further and in a
written decision told Hillsborough that any resubmitted compli-
45 See In re Petition for Substantive Certification of the Housing Element and
Fair Share Plan of the Township of Hillsborough, Somerset County, No. A-5349-95-
Ti (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 1997). I represent Appellant New Jersey Fu-
ture, Inc., which challenged the COAH grant of substantive certification to Hillsbor-
ough and have drawn the description which follows from the documents filed in the
case.
46 See SDRP, supra note 37, at 110-17 (containing a general description of the
rural planning area and the environmentally sensitive planning area).
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ance plan would have to be in strict conformity with the SDRP,
without waivers or other corner cutting techniques.47
The Hillsborough saga has been closely followed by the
housing and development communities and by the League of
Municipalities, and subsequent to the filing of the Hillsborough
lawsuit, both COAH and the State Planning Commission have
tightened their adherence to state plan policies in the context of
inclusionary zoning proposals. Hillsborough is at best a modest
first step, but it illustrates how incremental progress can be
made. In 1975, Justice Frederick Hall was a visionary on "sound
regional planning." Through all the tumult of the ensuing years,
however, the core requirement of the plan has been retained. By
following a path that is almost wholly unanticipated, New Jersey
has now begun to find a way to make its "non-regulatory" SDRP
useful in actually guiding growth and change in the state.
VI. BEYOND MOUNT LAUREL: ENFORCING THE STATE PLAN IN
THE COURTS
There is, however, a risk in all of this. As noted earlier, New
Jersey is singular in its Mount Laurel doctrine, and even if other
states were following suit (which they are not), implementation
of comprehensive, statewide planning should not be ridden solely
on the back of affordable housing initiatives. COAH is, at best,
an agency of limited jurisdiction. Indeed, to the extent that
statewide planning is anathema to developers, COAH-based en-
forcement risks providing a perverse incentive to avoid low-
income housing to avoid the SDRP.48 So the question becomes,
47 The COAH decision is unreported.
48 Low-income housing providers complain, not totally without reason, that in-
sisting on compliance with the SDRP through the COAH rules adds an extra hoop to
jump through that only inclusionary developers have to endure. Because the SDRP
is non-regulatory, they argue, a competing developer could propose luxury-only
housing, or a "big box" shopping mall, without having to think twice about statewide
planning criteria. What this argument ignores is that without the Mount Lau-
rel/COAH "hook," a municipality might very well say "no" altogether to these alter-
nate forms of development; state plan compliance may be an acceptable price to pay
for a developer which has learned (to its profit) that the Mount Laurel doctrine can
be used as a wedge to open up an otherwise closed town. This is an argument about
affordable housing policy, however, not one about the state plan. To the extent that
the current, limited enforcement of the SDRP occurs primarily through COAH is bad
housing policy, however, it also is bad planning policy generally, and reinforces the
need for a broader enforcement mechanism.
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can the evolving techniques by which the SDRP is beginning to
be enforced in COAH cases be applied in a more general way?
The answer is "yes," and as intimated above, the Mount Lau-
rel cases provide a model for how. Mount Laurel teaches that
land use regulation must conform to the general welfare in order
to be constitutional. Application of this "general welfare" crite-
rion is not a special requirement of affordable housing cases
alone. Serving the "general welfare" is the ancient formulation
that justifies (and therefore becomes a requirement for) any exer-
cise of the "police power," the general power of government to in-
terfere in private decision making.49 It is commonplace in ordi-
nary land use litigation that the challenger asserts that the
zoning decision does not satisfy the police power criterion, i.e.,
that it is arbitrary, and it is just as commonplace that the gov-
ernment responds that its decision does indeed serve the general
welfare.
It is also commonplace in land use litigation that, when the
general welfare criterion is put in issue, courts tend to defer to
the democratic decision making processes, i.e., they give defer-
ence to what the government asserts to be the general welfare.
This is for the completely practical reason that courts have no
adequate way, consistent with representative democracy, to
make their own "general welfare" decisions.50 Explicit departure
from that judicial norm is one of the things that made Mount
Laurel I so controversial. That in turn is why Chief Justice
Wilentz strained to find, in the SDGP, a suitable expression of
state policy to substitute for the court's own forays into housing
planning.
Thus, the general proposition comes to this. All land use
disputes put in issue the question of whether the general welfare,
as measured not only by local, but also by inter-local, regional,
and state concerns, has been served. A properly enacted land use
plan is a presumptively appropriate indicator of what land use
policies are needed to serve the general welfare, subject to the
49 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 147 (1877) (containing a classic statement,
drawn from federal law but in explanation of the meaning of the state's police
power).
50 See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.12 (3d ed. 1993)
(discussing how courts generally apply a presumption of constitutionality to land use
regulations); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 7-8 (1992) (same).
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very important qualification that the plan has been drafted, de-
bated, and decided at the level of the jurisdiction whose interests
are being asserted. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Mount
Laurel I reversed the presumption of constitutionality precisely
because parochial local interests, rather than the broader re-
gional interests affected by exclusionary zoning, were the only
ones engaged in the law-making process.
Courts may not be able to compel the creation of such gen-
eral welfare plans, but when a sound state or regional plan ex-
ists, it should carry, at least to some degree, a presumption that
it embodies the constitutionally required attempt to serve the
general welfare. When individual land use decisions are chal-
lenged, courts should recognize that decisions consistent with a
state or regional plan presumptively serve the general welfare,
insofar as plan-related issues are before the courts. Conversely,
and most importantly, decisions inconsistent with the state or
regional plan are presumptively inconsistent with the general
welfare and thus should bear a heavier burden of justification.
This does not involve judicial usurpation of legislative or execu-
tive powers since the plans that are used as reference points re-
main within the control of the political branches. 51
Without articulating a general theory, and without any
SDRP issues having yet reached the New Jersey Supreme Court,
the lower courts are nonetheless inching in the direction sug-
gested. In Sod Farm Associates v. Springfield Township,52 the
Appellate Division affirmed a trial court decision permitting the
municipality to change its mind about development along a major
highway corridor, relying in part upon the SDRP, which was not
in existence when the initial decisions were made. Justifying the
reasonableness of the municipality's change of heart, the Appel-
51 Rigid boilerplate rules are almost always unworkable in the fluid, policy-
driven context of land use law, and I do not mean to suggest that a presumption of
constitutionality should operate so mechanically as to preclude any result inconsis-
tent with the plan. Nor do courts apply rules of construction so mechanically very
often. Even a plan properly drafted at the appropriate level of regionalism may con-
tain features that are arbitrary or unfair to the point of being invalid, and a court
should not hesitate to so rule, just as it would in any other case. Chief Justice
Wilentz was well aware of this problem in Mount Laurel II, and he was at pains in
discussing the SDGP to leave litigants the opportunity to establish in particular
situations that the SDGP-based result was inappropriate. See Mount Laurel II, su-
pra note 1, at 431-33.
62 688 A.2d 1058 (N.J. Sup Ct. App. Div. 1996).
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late Division stated, "[olbviously, when the State Plan targeted
Springfield Township to remain rural, the township had to recon-
sider its earlier planning for a commercial corridor along Route
206."53
More recently, in Kirby v. Bedminster Township,54 an unre-
ported trial court decision, a landowner in wealthy, semi-rural
Bedminster Township challenged a town-wide rezoning that in-
creased his minimum lot size from roughly six to ten acres. The
court, in holding for the municipality, emphasized that Bedmin-
ster, virtually alone among New Jersey municipalities, had taken
advantage of an option feature of the State Planning Act called
"consistency review"55 and had sought from the State Planning
Commission a declaration that its land use ordinances (including
the challenged rezoning) were consistent with the SDRP. The
State Planning Commission had found that they were. Of par-
ticular interest in the Kirby case is that the court-appointed ex-
pert, a careful and well respected New Jersey planner, testified
that the plaintiffs land, which was somewhat isolated from the
main part of the zone and was close both to an interstate high-
way and to existing infrastructure in a neighboring municipality,
could plausibly have retained its six-acre zoning, although he
also found that the ten-acre rezoning was supportable. It was, in
the expert's words, a "fairly debatable" choice. 56 But in deferring
to the municipality's decision, and dismissing the landowner's
complaint, the court went on to add that "[iut is reasonable to
consider [the SDRP] as supporting the planning judgment of
Bedminister."57
Kirby, which is currently pending on appeal, is an especially
significant model because it demonstrates not only how the
53 Id. at 1060 (rejecting an argument that the township had had improper mo-
tives, i.e., that it had acted arbitrarily). The trial judge stated in part that "its desig-
nation in the recently completed State Development Plan as a 'Rural Planning
Area'... strongly buttress[es] the [Planning] Board's conclusion that preserving and
maintaining agricultural lands is a significant zoning and planning policy initiative
and not simply a pretextual argument to exclude housing." Sod Farm Assocs. v.
Springfield Township Planning Bd., 688 A.2d 1125, 1133 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div.
1995).
5 No. SOM-L-2464-4 PW (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 30, 1998).
55 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 17:32-7.1 (1999) (explaining the voluntary
process of consistency review).
56 See Kirby, No. SOM-L-2464-4 PW, at 21.
57 Id. at 14.
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courts can give practical effect to the concept of state and re-
gional planning, but also, in the consistency review, showing how
municipalities can use the state plan positively for their own
purposes.58 Note also that it would require only a small para-
phrase of the actual language quoted above for a different court
in another case to say, where the decision was inconsistent with
the state plan, "[lit [would not] be reasonable to consider [the
SDRP] as supporting the planning judgment" of the municipal-
ity.59
These are tantalizing tidbits. Sod Farm and Kirby hardly
add up to a "general welfare" movement in state and regional
planning law. But, small as they are, these steps are also very
real. The existence of the state plan helped to decide each of the
cases, even if the cases might well have been decided the same
way without the state plan. Indeed, the interstitial nature of
these small steps may be exactly what is required, if adjudication
is to eventually prod legislatures, governors, and mayors into
taking the regional planning process seriously. Both decisions fit
comfortably within the larger framework of land use adjudica-
tion, and thus they do not risk the major controversy, and the
major obstructionism, that the two Mount Laurel cases so fa-
mously stirred up.
Justice Frederick Hall, the author of Mount Laurel I, seems
to have genuinely believed in the idea of state and regional plan-
ning. If an unintended consequence of his long fight to establish
the Mount Laurel doctrine in the field of affordable housing is to
establish a foundation of legal principle under the concept of
multi-jurisdictional planning generally, his vision will have been
well served. Small steps make a long journey.
58 1 have filed an amicus curiae brief in the Appellate Division on behalf of New
Jersey Future (the appellant in In re Petition for Substantive Certification of the
Housing Element and Fair Share Plan of the Township of Hillsborough, Somerset
County, No. A-5349-95-T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 1997)), supporting the
court's use of the SDRP.
59 Kirby, No. SOM-L-2464-4 PW, at 14.
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